

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 SEOUL 06708 01 OF 07 110411Z

ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 EA-07 ISO-00 ACDA-07 MCE-00 OMB-01 TRSE-00

DHA-02 AID-05 IGA-02 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 CIAE-00

INR-07 NSAE-00 L-03 H-01 EB-08 /071 W

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R 110326Z AUG 77

FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5654

INFO SECDEF WASHDC

CINCPAC

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 7 SEOUL 6708

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS, KS, US

SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF US SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR FY 1979

REF: STATE 133136 (091616Z JUN 77)

1. THE FOLLOWING STUDY HAS BEEN PREPARED BY THE COUNTRY TEAM IN RESPONSE TO THE REQUEST CONTAINED IN REFTEL. THE SECTIONS ARE KEYED TO THE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS CONTAINED IN PARAS 3 AND 4 OF THAT MESSAGE.

US INTERESTS (PARA 3).

2. IN HIS LETTER TO PRESIDENT PAK, DELIVERED ON JULY 25, 1977, PRESIDENT CARTER SAID: "I WANT TO ASSURE YOU AGAIN THAT OUR GROUND FORCE WITHDRAWAL...WILL BE CARRIED OUT GRADUALLY AND CAREFULLY, IN A MANNER WHICH WILL PRESERVE PEACE ON THE PENINSULA." HE ADDED: "AT THE SAME TIME IT IS OUR INTENTION TO SEEK FROM THE CONGRESS SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR KOREA -- IN THE FORM OF SECOND DIVISION EQUIPMENT TRANSFERS AND ADDITIONAL FMS CREDITS -- SO THAT AS OUR GROUND TROOPS ARE WITHDRAWN, THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA WILL BE ABLE TO

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PAGE 02 SEOUL 06708 01 OF 07 110411Z

ASSUME A GREATER SHARE OF ITS DEFENSE RESPONSIBILITIES." AS THIS AND PREVIOUS STATEMENTS (E.G. MAY 26, MARCH 8) INDICATE, IT IS OUR POLICY TO COMPENSATE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF US GROUND COMBAT FORCES WITH INCREASED ASSISTANCE TO THE ROK MILITARY. TROOP WITHDRAWAL WITHOUT THE COMPENSATORY MEASURES ANNOUNCED BY THE PRESIDENT WOULD NOT ONLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THE ROKG, BUT MIGHT ALSO CALL INTO QUESTION THE WISDOM OF PURSUING

THAT WITHDRAWAL POLICY.

3. FURTHERMORE, THE US SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IN THE ROK SERVES US SECURITY, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INTERESTS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND TO A GREAT EXTENT IN NORTHEAST ASIA AS A WHOLE. US SECURITY INTERESTS ARE DIRECTED TOWARD THE MAINTENANCE OF A RELATIVELY STABLE POWER BALANCE IN NORTHEAST ASIA. KOREA REMAINS A PROBLEM AREA IN CONTINUING THIS BALANCE. US SECURITY ASSISTANCE HAS PROVIDED THE UNDERPINNING WHICH HAS ALLOWED THE ROK TO INCREASE ITS OWN EFFORTS TO THAT OBJECTIVE. IN A BROADER CONTEXT OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE HAS REAFFIRMED THE STRENGTH OF THE US COMMITMENT IN THE NORTHEAST ASIAN REGION. THIS COMMITMENT HAS NOT GONE UNNOTICED BY NORTH KOREA AND THE OTHER MAJOR ACTORS IN THE REGION; THE USSR, CHINA AND JAPAN.

4. US ECONOMIC INTERESTS ARE ALSO CLEARLY INVOLVED IN THE NORTHEAST ASIA REGION. US TRADE WITH THE AREA IS NOW GREATER THAN THAT WITH THE EEC AND SHOWS PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER INCREASE. INCREASED TENSION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA COULD NOT BUT HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE IMPACT ON THIS TRADE SITUATION. IN A NARROWER CONTEXT, US SECURITY ASSISTANCE, AS IT PROVIDES A MORE SECURE CLIMATE FOR ROK ECONOMIC GROWTH, ALSO CONTAINS THE ELEMENTS NEEDED TO REDUCE THE COST BURDEN ON THE US AS THE ROK ECONOMY BECOMES MORE ABLE TO BEAR A GREATER PROPORTION OF SECURITY COSTS.

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SECRET

PAGE 03 SEOUL 06708 01 OF 07 110411Z

NOT ONLY DOES THE STABLE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT INDUCE GREATER CONFIDENCE WITHIN THE ROK BUT ALSO AMONG THOSE NATIONS ABLE TO SUPPLY THE CAPITAL NEEDED FOR CONTINUED ECONOMIC GROWTH.

5. IN THE POLITICAL ARENA US SECURITY ASSISTANCE, BY PROVIDING SUFFICIENT DETERRENT POWERS TO DEMONSTRATE TO NORTH KOREA THAT A MILITARY OPTION IS NOT A VIABLE SOLUTION TO THE DIVISION OF THE COUNTRY, SERVES TO DIRECT INTEREST AND ATTENTION TO THE POSSIBLE POLITICAL SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM. NOT ONLY IN SOLVING THE KOREAN PROBLEM BUT IN OUR WIDER POLITICAL GOALS IN NORTHEAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, OUR ASSISTANCE MAINTAINS THE CLIMATE NECESSARY TO PURSUE OUR GOALS OF ACHIEVING A MORE OPEN AND NORMAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NATIONS OF THE REGION THROUGH POLITICAL EXCHANGE IN A STABLE ENVIRONMENT.

6. WITHIN THE ROK ITSELF, OUR POLITICAL AIM IS TO WORK TOWARD A MORE OPEN AND DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY WITH GREATER ACCEPTANCE OF INTERNATIONALLY ENDORSED STANDARDS OF HUMAN RIGHTS. SECURITY CONCERNS HAVE BEEN THE ROK'S

PRINCIPAL JUSTIFICATION FOR RESTRICTING POLITICAL FREEDOM.
AN INCREASED CONFIDENCE IN ITS ABILITY TO WITHSTAND
EXTERNAL PRESSURES, BOTH MILITARY AND POLITICAL, SHOULD
INCREASE CONFIDENCE WITHIN THE ROKG IN ITS ABILITY TO
DEAL OPENLY AND EFFECTIVELY WITH DIVERGENT VIEWS WITHIN
ITS OWN BORDERS.

7. OUR HOPES OF MAINTAINING MAXIMUM LEVERAGE IN ALL
AREAS OF US INTEREST RELY IN GREAT PART ON THE US
SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. THE CONFIDENCE OF THE

SECRET

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PAGE 01 SEOUL 06708 02 OF 07 110450Z
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 EA-07 ISO-00 ACDA-07 MCE-00 OMB-01 TRSE-00
DHA-02 AID-05 IGA-02 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 CIAE-00
INR-07 NSAE-00 L-03 H-01 EB-08 /071 W
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FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5655
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
CINCPAC

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 7 SEOUL 6708

ROK IS THE CENTRAL ISSUE. WORK IS UNDERWAY TO ENABLE
THE ROK TO PROVIDE MORE OF ITS DEFENSE NEEDS FROM
DOMESTIC SOURCES. HOWEVER, THE ROK, AS MUCH AS
ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT, HAS RELIED UPON US MILITARY
SUPPORT AND HAS BASED ITS TOTAL DEFENSE CAPABILITY
UPON SUCH SUPPORT. THIS POSTURE IS WELL RECOGNIZED
BY OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION AND THUS ANY MAJOR
SHIFT BY THE US IN THIS AREA COULD BE DESTABILIZING
BOTH WITHIN THE ROK AND WITHIN THE REGION AS A WHOLE.

THREAT (PARA 4A)

8. THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA BELIEVES IT FACES AN IMMEDIATE
AND SERIOUS THREAT FROM NORTH KOREA, A NATION WITH ARMED
FORCES OF COMAPRABLE SIZE IN TERMS OF MANPOWER TO THOSE OF
THE ROK, MORE HEAVILY EQUIPPED, AND ACTIVELY HOSTILE
TOWARD THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA GOVERNMENT. BEHIND NORTH
KOREA STAND THE SOVIET UNION AND PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA,
WHICH HAVE CONTINUED TO PROVIDE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO

NORTH KOREA AND TO PUBLICLY SUPPORT DPRK POLICIES. DESPITE THE APPARENT DESIRE OF BOTH THE USSR AND THE PRC TO AVOID AN OPEN CONFLICT IN THE REGION, THEY WOULD PROBABLY BE OBLIGED BY IDEOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND THEIR RIVALRY WITH

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PAGE 02 SEOUL 06708 02 OF 07 110450Z

ONE ANOTHER TO GIVE AT LEAST LOGISTIC SUPPORT TO NORTH KOREA IF A WAR SHOULD BREAK OUT. ANY BASIC CHANGE OF POWER RELATIONSHIPS IN THE AREA MOREOVER COULD CAUSE THEM TO REVIEW THEIR INTERESTS IN AVOIDING CONFLICT. THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA GOVERNMENT AND GENERAL PUBLIC REGARD THESE DANGERS, AND SPECIFICALLY THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ARMED ATTACK BY NORTH KOREA, AS REAL AND CONSTANT. AS JUSTIFICATION FOR THEIR FEARS, THEY POINT TO THE GEOPOLITICAL POSITION OF THE FOUR MAJOR POWERS IN QUESTION AND TO THE FACT THAT TROOPS OF THE THREE COMMUNIST POWERS HAVE ENTERED KOREA IN THE MEMORY OF MOST ADULT KOREANS.

9. THE PREFERRED ROK STRATEGY FOR DEALING WITH ITS SITUATION IS: (A) TO MAINTAIN THE MAXIMUM FEASIBLE U.S. MILITARY, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT. (THE KOREANS WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO RETAIN U.S. GROUND COMBAT FORCES IN COUNTRY AS THE BEST DETERRENT TO A NORTH KOREAN ATTACK; FAILING THAT THEY FEEL THAT INCREASED SECURITY ASSISTANCE IS ESSENTIAL); (B) TO DEVELOP ROK ECONOMIC AND MILITARY CAPABILITIES TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE (WITH INCREASED STRESS NOW ON MILITARY STRENGTH SINCE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT HAS BEEN SUCCESSFULLY LAUNCHED AND AS U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWAL BECOMES A REALITY); (C) TO DEVELOP THE WIDEST POSSIBLE DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC TIES WITH OTHER NATIONS; AND (D) TO CONTINUE EFFORTS AT A LIMITED ACCOMMODATION WITH NORTH KOREA BASED ON INCREASED DIRECT CONTACT AND SIMULTANEOUS ADMISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS.

10. THE EMBASSY SHARES THE OVERALL ASSESSMENT OUTLINED ABOVE (ALTHOUGH THERE IS SOME VARIATION IN ESTIMATES AS TO JUST HOW IMMEDIATE THE DANGER IS). THE ESSENTIALS OF THE REGIONAL POWER EQUATION ARE NOT MUCH IN DISPUTE AND THE STRATEGIES FOLLOWED BY THE ROK GOVERNMENT APPEAR TO BE

SECRET

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PAGE 03 SEOUL 06708 02 OF 07 110450Z

RATIONAL RESPONSES TO THE SITUATION WHICH EXISTS.

11. THE ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE TO THE U.S. COVER A FAIRLY WIDE VARIETY OF U.S. AND LOCAL FORCE MIXES, BUT GIVEN U.S. INTEREST IN REGIONAL STABILITY IN NORTHEAST

ASIA, A SUBSTANTIAL U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE AREA SEEMS ESSENTIAL IN THE NEAR TERM. IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO DEVELOP REPUBLIC OF KOREA MILITARY STRENGTH TO REPLACE CERTAIN U.S. FORCES. HOWEVER, IT IS NOT REALISTIC TO EXPECT THAT THE ROK COULD RESIST AN ATTACK BY EITHER THE SOVIET UNION OR THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, AND IF OTHER NATIONS IN THE AREA CONCLUDE THAT THE U.S. IS NO LONGER PREPARED TO EXERCISE ITS MILITARY STRENGTH IN NORTHEAST ASIA, A HIGHLY UNSTABLE SITUATION WOULD RESULT.

12. A GRADUAL REDUCTION IN U.S. ASSISTANCE SHOULD ALSO BE POSSIBLE AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL RELATED INCREASES AND THE KOREAN FORCE IMPROVEMENT PLAN (KFIP) ARE COMPLETED, IF NORTH KOREAN ARMAMENTS ARE NOT FURTHER INCREASED. HOWEVER, IF KOREA AND ITS NEIGHBORS DECIDE THAT U.S. LOGISTIC SUPPORT WOULD NOT BE PROVIDED IN THE EVENT OF WAR, THE POSITION OF THE ROK WOULD BE SERIOUSLY ERODED AND THE RISK OF CONFRONTATION MARKEDLY INCREASED. ANOTHER LIMIT TO U.S. ALTERNATIVES IS THE POSITION OF JAPAN. WHILE INCREASED JAPANESE MILITARY CAPABILITY COULD HELP IN SOME RESPECTS TO STABILIZE THE REGION, THE POSSIBILITIES OF SUCH A DEVELOPMENT ARE LIMITED BY A) SENSITIVITY OF OTHER NATIONS IN ASIA TO JAPANESE POWER, AND B) THE LIMITS JAPAN HERSELF PERCEIVES IN HER OWN CAPACITY TO MOUNT A REALLY EFFECTIVE DEFENSE EFFORT AGAINST THE TYPE OF THREAT JAPAN WOULD FACE.

FORCE STRUCTURE (PARA 4C)

13. THE PLANNED ROK FORCE STRUCTURE SHOWN BELOW IS DEPENDENT ON AND INTERRELATED WITH THE U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWAL PLAN AND THE CORRESPONDING IMPROVEMENT IN ROK FORCES CAPABILITY.

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PAGE 04 SEOUL 06708 02 OF 07 110450Z

ROK FORCES SHOULD BE ABLE TO UNILATERALLY DETER/DEFEND AGAINST NORTH KOREAN AGGRESSION, WITH U.S. TACTICAL AIR, NAVAL AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT IN THE EVENT OF WAR. TO ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE, THE ROK IS ENGAGED IN A PROGRAMMED IMPROVEMENT OF ITS MILITARY FORCE STRUCTURE. IN FY 79 THIS FORCE STRUCTURE IS PROJECTED TO INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING MAJOR COMBAT AND TACTICAL ELEMENTS, CONSISTING OF ABOUT 600,000 ACTIVE FORCES PERSONNEL AND 2 PLUS MILLION HOMELAND RESERVE (HRDF) FORCES:

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PAGE 01 SEOUL 06708 03 OF 07 110421Z
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 EA-07 ISO-00 ACDA-07 MCE-00 OMB-01 TRSE-00
DHA-02 AID-05 IGA-02 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 CIAE-00
INR-07 NSAE-00 L-03 H-01 EB-08 /071 W
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R 110326Z AUG 77
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5656
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
CINCPAC

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 7 SEOUL 6708

ROK ARMY

22 COMBAT DIVISIONS#	34 CMBT ENGR BNS
1 SEP INF BDE	4 AMMO DEPOTS
3 SEP INF RGTS	5 AMMO BNS
7 SPECIAL FORCES BDES	20 MAINT CO'S
2 SEP ARMOR BDES	3 FIELD ARTY GPS
7 SEP TANK BNS	51 155MM HOW BNS
17 TOW COMPANIES	112 105MM HOW BNS
16 APC COMPANIES	15 8" HOW BNS
5 ENGR BDES	2 HONEST JOHN BNS
7 ENGR GPS	3 TARGET ACQ BNS
10 CONST BNS	1 OERLIKON BN

18 INF DIV; 1 MECH. DIV; 3 READY RES DIV (MANNED AT FULL STRENGTH)

11 VULCAN BNS	3 500MD HEL CO'S
2 IMPROVED HAWK BNS	1 TRANS AVN DEPOT
2 NIKE HERC BNS	9 LOG SPT CMDS
1 AVIATION BDE	6 SUPPLY BNS
1 AVIATION GP	8 MAINT BNS
1 MOBILE HELO BN	1 POL BN
2 AVN MOBILE CO'S	1 CHEM BN

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PAGE 02 SEOUL 06708 03 OF 07 110421Z

1 ARMED HELO BN	25 SIGNAL BNS
4 ATK HELO CO'S	

AIR FORCES

19 TACTICAL FIGHTER SQDNS (F-4D/E, F-86, F-5A/B, F-5E/F)
3 TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT SQDNS (O-1, O-2, OV-10)
1 HELICOPTER SQ (UH-1B/H)

3 TRANSPORT SQDNS (C-123J/K, C-130)
1 TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE SQ (RF-5A)
1 ELECTRONIC WARFARE SQ (EC-47)
10 AC&W SQ (RADARS, COMM EQ)
VARIOUS SUPPORT UNITS (LOGISTICS, TRAINING, SCHOOLS)

NAVAL FORCES:

13 PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS (DESTROYERS, FRIGATES)
44 COASTAL PATROL TYPES (PATROL FRIGATES, PATROL ESCORT,
MISSILE PATROL CRAFT, PATROL BOATS)
55 FAST BOAT CRAFT (CPIC, PATROL BOAT MEDIUM PATROL
BOAT SMALL)
11 MINE WARFARE TYPES (COASTAL MINESWEEPER, MINEHUNTER AND
MINELAYER)
72 AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE TYPES (LST, LSM, LSMC, LCU, LCM)
11 AUXILIARY TYPES (ATA, AOL, AKL, ARL, REPLENISHMENT SHIPS)
46 NAVAL AIRCRAFT (ASW, HELICOPTER, MISC ACFT)
24 SURVEILLANCE SPT COASTAL RADARS
VARIOUS SUPPORT UNITS (LOGISTICS, TRAINING, SCHOOLS)

NAVY/MARINE FORCES:

1 MARINE DIVISION INCLUDING:
3 INFANTRY REGIMENTS
1 AVIATION BN
1 RECONNAISSANCE CO.
1 ARTILLERY REGIMENT
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 SEOUL 06708 03 OF 07 110421Z

1 ENGINEER BN
1 TANK BN
1 COMM BN
1 AMPHIBIOUS BN
1 BEACH SUPPORT GP
1 MARINE BRIGADE (SEPARATE) INCLUDING:
4 INF BNS
1 105 FA BN
1 RECONNAISSANCE CO.
1 MARINE BRIGADE (MIDU) INCLUDING:
3 INF BNS
105 FA BN
7 FORWARD AREA AIR DEF TEAMS
1 REGIMENTAL LANDING TEAM

14. WE VIEW THE PROPOSED FORCE STRUCTURE AS GENERALLY BEING
REALISTIC. HOWEVER, A SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT ARTILLERY MIX, WITH
MORE 155 HOWITZER BATTALIONS AND FEWER 105S WOULD BE PREFERABLE.
ALSO, THE WARTIME RESERVE MATERIEL REQUIREMENTS OF THE PROPOSED
FORCE NEED REVIEW.

15. ATTAINMENT OF THE PROJECTED LEVELS APPEARS REASONABLY

FEASIBLE, ALTHOUGH SOME ITEMS, SUCH AS HELICOPTERS, MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE FROM PRODUCTION SCHEDULES AT THAT TIME. ALTERNATIVE MIXES OF VARIOUS WEAPONS WILL, OF COURSE, BE CONSIDERED; THE PLAN IS, IN FACT, UNDER REVIEW ANNUALLY, BY ROK AND US WITH THE PROSPECT OF SOME ADJUSTMENTS. HOWEVER, THE OVERALL MODERNIZATION PROGRAM WARRANTS U.S. SUPPORT TO THE EXTENT PLANNED, WITH THE MAJOR FINANCIAL BURDEN BEING BORNE BY THE ROK.

SECRET

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SECRET

PAGE 01 SEOUL 06708 04 OF 07 110356Z
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 EA-07 ISO-00 ACDA-07 MCE-00 OMB-01 TRSE-00
DHA-02 AID-05 IGA-02 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 CIAE-00
INR-07 NSAE-00 L-03 H-01 EB-08 /071 W
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R 110326Z AUG 77
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5657
INFO SECDEF
CINCPAC

S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 7 SEOUL 6708

FY 79 ACQUISITIONS (PARA 4D)

16. ROK MILITARY DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS IN FY 79
WILL BE PART OF A MULTI-YEAR ROK FORCE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM PROJECTED FOR 1975-80. THIS PROGRAM, WHILE SUBJECT TO CONTINUING REVIEW, IS MILITARILY VALID AND SUPPORTIVE OF THE SA OBJECTIVE CITED ABOVE, I.E. TO ASSIST THE ROK IN ACHIEVING A MILITARY FORCE CAPABLE OF UNILATERALLY DETERRING/DEFENDING AGAINST NORTH KOREAN AGGRESSION WITH US TACTICAL AIR, NAVAL AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT IN THE EVENT OF WAR. TO PRIORITIZE THE ACQUISITIONS FOR A SINGLE YEAR IN ANY PRACTICAL SENSE WOULD BE DIFFICULT OR IMPOSSIBLE SINCE MOST MAJOR ACQUISITIONS ARE PART OF MULTI-YEAR PROJECTS AND ALL ARE INTERRELATED TO PROVIDE A BALANCED FORCE STRUCTURE. THE SEQUENCE OF ACQUISITION IS MORE LIKELY TO BE DETERMINED BY AVAILABILITY THAN BY NEED. THE FOLLOWING TABLE REPRESENTS OUR CURRENT ESTIMATE, SUBJECT TO THE ABOVE CAVEATS, OF ITEMS THE ROK WILL PROBABLY SEEK TO ACQUIRE IN FY 79 UNDER FMS CREDITS AND ESTIMATED ROKG CASH

EXPENDITURES. IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT SOME ITEMS
PROJECTED FOR PROCUREMENT (E.G. F-16, A-10) HAVE NOT
YET BEEN DECIDED ON ALTHOUGH THEIR ACQUISITION IS BEING
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SEOUL 06708 04 OF 07 110356Z

CONSIDERED.

FY79 FMS CREDIT (\$ IN MIL)

F-4E	65.0	M-16 RIFLE CO-PRO	2.9
F-5E/F	29.9	155MM ARTY	10.2
F-16	4.2	SURV & TGT ACQ EQ	8.6
A-10	2.0	AD CMD & CNTL EQ	2.7
UH-1H	14.0	RHAW (WARNING RADAR)	3.5
CH-47	22.4	ECM	4.5
AIM-9 MOD	6.7	GND SURV EQ	13.4
AIM-7E	12.3	AGE (KTACS)	10.0
IMP HAWK	29.5	IMP RADAR & EQ	2.0
HARPOON	6.0	GAP FILLER RADAR	1.4
TOW	2.9	AMMO ARSENAL	.3
SMART/MAVERICK	1.0	A/C MAINT DEPOT	2.5
M-48 TANK UPGRADE	22.2	NIGHT FIRING DEVICE	.7

FMS CREDIT TOTAL 280.8

FMS CASH (\$ IN MIL)

AERO MOD		MISSILES	
F-4E	9.0	IMP HAWK	7.2
F-5E/F	39.7	AIM-9 MOD	2.5
OV-10	32.5	HARPOON	5.2
A-10	77.4	TOW	1.5
CH-47	14.2	SHRIKE	.6
UH-1H	17.2	TOTAL	17.0
C-130	62.0		
F-16	134.3		
TOTAL	386.3		

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PAGE 03 SEOUL 06708 04 OF 07 110356Z

NAVAL MOD		WEAPONS: OVER 75MM	
PKM/EQ	17.8	90 MM RR RIFLE	.7
LCU	3.8	106MM RR	.2
MISC BOATS	3.4	81MM MORTARS	.9

SHIP SPT. EQ .6	4.2" MORTARS .5
TOTAL 25.6	105MM HOW 2.3
	155MM .8
	TOTAL 5.4

GROUND MOBILITY WEAPONS: UNDER 75MM

AVLB (BRIDGING) 3.0	VULCAN 13.4
CEV (COMBAT ENGR. VEH) 4.8	MISC 2.9
INDIGENOUS TANK 2.0	TOTAL 16.3
TACT VEHICLES 31.6	
TOTAL 41.4	

COMMAND & CONTROL OTHER ARTICLES & SPT 40.3

MISC EQ 59.8

OPERATIONS & MAINT 300.2 TRAINING 25.1

TOTAL FMS CASH 917.4

US COMMERCIAL

MACHINE GUN M-60 CO-PRO	12.3
500 MD HELO CO-PRO	12.8
LAADS (LOW ALTITUDE AIR DELIVERY SYS)	15.0
TOTAL	40.1
GRAND TOTAL FMS CR/CASH/COMM	\$1,238.3

ECONOMIC IMPACT (PARA 4E)

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 SEOUL 06708 04 OF 07 110356Z

17. IF, AS THE KOREANS HAVE AFFIRMED, THE ROKG RESTRAINS DEFENSE SPENDING TO ABOUT 7 PERCENT OF GNP AND THERE ARE NO SERIOUS INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, THERE SHOULD BE LITTLE DIFFICULTY IN ACHIEVING PROPOSED DEFENSE GOALS WITHOUT SERIOUS DISRUPTION TO THE ECONOMY. MOREOVER, SOME ADDITIONAL BORROWINGS FOR DEFENSE PURPOSES NEED NOT AFFECT DOMESTIC PRIORITIES AS LONG AS THE FAVORABLE CURRENT ACCOUNT PERFORMANCE CONTINUES.

18. THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT MAY HAVE TO BORROW DUE TO BUDGETARY SHORTFALLS TO PAY FOR STEPPED UP DEFENSE SPENDING DURING THE FIRST THREE YEARS; HOWEVER, OUR CALCULATIONS SHOW THAT THE DEBT SERVICE RATIO

SECRET

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PAGE 01 SEOUL 06708 05 OF 07 110508Z

ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 EA-07 ISO-00 ACDA-07 MCE-00 OMB-01 TRSE-00

DHA-02 AID-05 IGA-02 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 CIAE-00

INR-07 NSAE-00 L-03 H-01 EB-08 /071 W

-----085387 110509Z /15

R 110326Z AUG 77

FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5658

INFO SECDEF

CINCPAC

S E C R E T SECTION 5 OF 7 SEOUL 6708

(PRINCIPAL AND INTEREST PAYMENTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF CURRENT RECEIPTS) WOULD NOT RISE SIGNIFICANTLY ABOVE THAT WHICH THE KOREAN PLANNERS FORECAST IN THE FOURTH FIVE YEAR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLAN (FFYP). IF AN ADDITIONAL \$400 MILLION IN 1978 AND \$300 MILLION IN 1979 FOR DEFENSE INVESTMENT COSTS ARE NEEDED, AND PROVIDED A MINIMUM OF \$275 MILLION PER YEAR IN FMS CREDITS IS AVAILABLE, BORROWING ON COMMERCIAL TERMS RAISES THE DEBT SERVICE RATIO TO 13.2 IN 1978, 13.1 IN 1979 AND 13.4 IN 1980, FOLLOWED BY A STEADY DECLINE THEREAFTER. FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES COULD STILL REACH \$4.6 BILLION IN 1979 BY INCREASING RATHER THAN REDUCING SHORT TERM CAPITAL INFLOWS.

19. WHETHER SPENDING FOR DEFENSE PURPOSES WILL CROWD OUT DEVELOPMENT FINANCING IS MORE DIFFICULT TO ASSESS SINCE SOME EFFECTS MAY NOT BE FELT FOR SEVERAL YEARS. WE ASSUME THAT AN ADDITIONAL \$300 MILLION A YEAR IN DEFENSE REVENUE IS POSSIBLE BY REDUCING PRIVATE CONSUMPTION GROWTH BY 2 PERCENT PER YEAR DURING THE FFYP. WE DO NOT PERCEIVE A NEED FOR SUCH AN INCREASED BURDEN, PROVIDED ANY SHORTFALL IN REVENUE CAN BE FUNDED FROM COMMERCIAL SOURCES OR ADDITIONAL FMS CREDITS. (IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER NAM IS CONCERNED THAT VALUE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SEOUL 06708 05 OF 07 110508Z

ADDED TAX REVENUES MAY FALL SHORT OF EXPECTATIONS, REQUIRING AN INCREASE IN OTHER TAXES.) ANY FURTHER REDUCTION IN DISPOSABLE INCOME BY INCREASED TAXATION COULD HAVE AN

ADVERSE EFFECT ON NATIONAL SAVINGS WHICH MUST REACH 26 PERCENT OF GNP IN 1981 IF GROWTH TARGETS ARE TO BE MET. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT GROWTH MUST AVERAGE 9 PERCENT PER ANNUM BETWEEN NOW AND 1990, IF KOREA IS TO BE ABLE TO ABSORB THE INCREASING LABOR FORCE AND TO MAINTAIN ITS PRESENT EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME. IF DOMESTIC SAVINGS ARE UNABLE TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY INVESTMENT FUNDS TO ATTAIN AN ADEQUATE GROWTH RATE, INCREASED FOREIGN BORROWINGS WOULD BE REQUIRED, BUT MAY NOT BE READILY AVAILABLE IF FOREIGN CREDITORS ARE SCARED OFF BY WHAT LOOKS LIKE A DETERIORATING BALANCE OF PAYMENTS.

20. WASHINGTON AGENCIES SHOULD NOTE THAT FOR PLANNING PURPOSES THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT INCLUDES FMS CREDITS WITH ANNUAL MILITARY EXPENDITURES TO GIVE AN OVERALL PICTURE OF THE DEFENSE BURDEN. ALSO INCLUDED IN THE AGGREGATE ARE GRANT AID, COSTS OF THE SPECIAL COMBAT POLICE (INCLUDED IN THE MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS BUDGET) AND THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT TRANSFER SPECIAL ACCOUNT (A SELF-SUSTAINING ENTITY). UNFORTUNATELY, THE CALCULATIONS INCLUDE DEBT SERVICE ON FMS CREDITS AS WELL AS THE CREDITS THEREBY CAUSING DOUBLE COUNTING. ACCORDING TO DATA PROVIDED US BY EPB, USING THAT METHOD, THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT CALCULATES THE TOTAL COSTS OF THEIR DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT AT \$1.887 BILLION IN 1976 AND \$2.212 BILLION IN 1977 (485 WON EQUALS \$1 U.S.) OR 7.6 PERCENT AND 7.1 PERCENT OF GNP IN 1976 AND 1977, RESPECTIVELY. WE HAVE REFINED THIS SOMEWHAT BY USING A 484 EXCHANGE RATE AND SUBTRACTING BOTH GRANT AID AND FMS CREDITS (INCLUDING SUBSTANTIAL TRANSITIONAL QUARTER SUMS IN FY 76). DOING SO WE GET DEFENSE/GNP
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PAGE 03 SEOUL 06708 05 OF 07 110508Z

RATIOS OF 6.26 FOR 1976 AND 6.62 FOR 1977. WE WILL CONTINUE TO USE THIS CONCEPT FOR PLANNING PURPOSES.

US PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS (PARA 4F)

21. A JUSMAG-K MANNING STRENGTH OF 168 US (MILITARY AND CIVILIAN) AND 12 CIVILIAN CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL IS REQUIRED DURING FY 1979. JUSMAG STRENGTH MUST ALSO BE MAINTAINED AT SUFFICIENTLY HIGH LEVELS FOR THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS TO BE ABLE TO EFFECTIVELY ASSIST FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROK DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT AND DEFENSE INDUSTRIES. THESE PERSONNEL WILL BE WORKING PRIMARILY TO HELP ELIMINATE ROK WEAKNESSES IN PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, BUDGETING, AND OTHER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT TASKS. THIS CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT IS ESSENTIAL FOR EFFECTIVE ROK PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT OF ITS DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT, FOR MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF THE COMPLEX WEAPONRY BEING ACQUIRED AND IN FURTHERANCE OF

THE ROK DEFENSE INDUSTRY ALONG APPROPRIATE LINES. IN ADDITION TO THE REGULAR JUSMAG-K MANNING LEVEL, AN INDETERMINATE NUMBER OF SPECIAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PERSONNEL (TEAMS) WILL BE REQUIRED FOR INTRODUCTION OF SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS SYSTEMS WHICH THE ROK IS ACQUIRING AND DEVELOPING. MAINTENANCE OF A SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE GROUP FACILITATES US EFFORTS TO ENSURE THAT ROK DEFENSE PROGRAMS CONTINUE TO BE DIRECTED ALONG LINES THAT ACCORD WITH US INTERESTS. THERE ARE NO PROBLEMS ANTICIPATED BECAUSE OF ANY ADDED PERSONNEL; CONVERSELY, ROK HAS ALWAYS EXPRESSED STRONG CONCERN OVER ANY PLANNED REDUCTION OF THE US PRESENCE IN ITS COUNTRY.

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PAGE 01 SEOUL 06708 06 OF 07 110430Z
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 EA-07 ISO-00 ACDA-07 MCE-00 OMB-01 TRSE-00
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INFO SECDEF
CINCPAC

S E C R E T SECTION 6 OF 7 SEOUL 6708

THIRD COUNTRY SOURCES (PARA 4 G)

22. THIRD COUNTRY RESOURCES ARE OF COURSE READILY AVAILABLE FOR ACQUISITION BY THE ROK IN MANY CATEGORIES AND THE ROK IS INCREASINGLY IN A POSITION TO PAY FOR THEM. SO FAR, HOWEVER, THE ROKG HAS GENERALLY FAVORED PROCUREMENT OF US WEAPONS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT, FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS, PARTLY POLITICAL, PARTLY THE TECHNICAL COMPATIBILITY OF US ITEMS WITH EQUIPMENT ALREADY ON HAND, AND PARTLY THE FAMILIARITY OF ROK MILITARY PERSONNEL WITH US PRODUCTS AND PROCEDURES, WHICH ARE OFTEN SUPERIOR IN TERMS OF QUALITY AND PRICE, AS WELL. HOWEVER, THE ROK HAS ACQUIRED SOME EQUIPMENT FROM THIRD COUNTRIES IN RECENT YEARS, INCLUDING FRENCH EXOCET MISSILES AND ALOUETTE HELICOPTERS, SWISS OERLIKON ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS, AND ITALIAN OTO-MELARA SHIP-MOUNTED

GUNS WHEN COMPARABLE ITEMS COULD NOT BE OBTAINED FROM THE US. RECENTLY, NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED WITH THE BRITISH ON THE RAPIER SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE AND WITH THE GERMANS ON TANK PRODUCTION. THE PRIMARY FACTOR IN THE ROK'S ENTERING INTO THESE THIRD-COUNTRY NEGOTIATIONS HAS ALWAYS BEEN THE NON-AVAILABILITY OF COMPARABLE WEAPONS FROM THE US, WHETHER AS A MATTER
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PAGE 02 SEOUL 06708 06 OF 07 110430Z

OF POLICY OR OF PRODUCTION SCHEDULES.

23. NONETHELESS, IF THE US DOES NOT PROVIDE THE ROK WITH WEAPONS IT NEEDS, THE KOREANS WILL UNDOUBTEDLY PROCEED TO OBTAIN THEM FROM OTHERS WHO ARE PREPARED TO MAKE AVAILABLE BOTH THE EQUIPMENT AND TO SOME EXTENT CREDITS FOR PURCHASE. AN INCREASINGLY SIGNIFICANT FACTOR MAY BE THE WILLINGNESS OF OTHER NATIONS TO PROVIDE TECHNOLOGY THROUGH CO-PRODUCTION AGREEMENTS, IF THE US IS ONLY WILLING TO PROVIDE THE FINISHED PRODUCT.

ARMS CONTROL IMPACT (PARA 4H)

24. THE IMPACT OF FORECAST ROK ACQUISITIONS IN ARMS CONTROL TERMS IS A MAJOR FACTOR IN DECISIONS ON RELEASE OF SPECIFIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS BY THE U.S. THE FORECAST ACQUISITIONS WILL NOT BRING THE ROK TO PARITY WITH NORTH KOREA IN TERMS OF MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT, NOR WILL THEY INCLUDE ANY WEAPONS THAT WOULD HEIGHTEN TENSIONS ON THE PENINSULA.

25. US POLICY IN KOREA HAS BEEN BASED FOR MANY YEARS ON MAINTENANCE OF A BALANCE OF MILITARY CAPABILITIES THAT WOULD PRECLUDE EITHER NORTH OR SOUTH FROM ATTAINING A DECISIVE ADVANTAGE, WHICH MIGHT IN TURN ENCOURAGE AN INVASION OR PREEMPTIVE ATTACK. THE NEEDS OF ROK FORCES IN THIS CONTEXT ARE VIEWED IN CONNECTION WITH COMPLIMENTARY U.S. FORCES. SOVIET AND PRC FORCES ARE ALSO TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT AS ARE THOSE OF JAPAN. IT SHOULD BE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT ARMS CONTROL QUESTIONS WITH THE USSR AND PRC INVOLVE FAR MORE THAN THE KOREAN EQUATION. AS REGARDS JAPAN, THE GOJ APPEARS TO REGARD ROK ARMAMENT,
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PAGE 03 SEOUL 06708 06 OF 07 110430Z

UP TO A POINT, AS COMPLIMENTING THAT OF JAPAN SO THAT INCREASES OF ROK EQUIPMENT WITHIN PRESENTLY FORESEEABLE

LIMITS WOULD NOT CALL FOR CORRESPONDING ACQUISITIONS BY JAPAN. (MOREOVER, JAPAN AND OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES ALREADY HAVE WEAPONS COMPARABLE TO THOSE THE ROK HAS OR IS ACQUIRING.) THE SAME ATTITUDE APPEARS TO PREVAIL IN OTHER NON-COMMUNIST ASIAN NATIONS, NONE OF WHOM HAVE INDICATED CONCERN ABOUT CURRENT OR PROJECTED ROK ARMAMENT LEVELS.

HUMAN RIGHTS (PARA 4I)

26. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK WHICH EMPOWERS THE ROKG TO CONTROL POLITICAL DISSENT HAS REMAINED INTACT BUT THERE HAVE BEEN VARIOUS DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AREA OF HUMAN RIGHTS. THE PRESS HAS ENJOYED A WIDER MEASURE OF FREEDOM THAN IN 1976, AND, IN EARLY 1977, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ALTERED THE MANNER IN WHICH THE EMERGENCY MEASURES WERE ENFORCED, WITH PREFERENCE GIVEN TO PREVENTIVE MEASURES AIMED AT FRUSTRATING DEMONSTRATIONS OR OTHER PUBLIC EXPRESSION OF DISSIDENT OPINION, RATHER THAN TO FORMAL ARREST OR LONG-TERM DETENTION OF INDIVIDUALS. THIS APPROACH HAS INVOLVED, AT TIMES, A FAIRLY INTENSE LEVEL OF SURVEILLANCE AND SOME SHORT-TERM PREVENTIVE DETENTION BUT AT OTHER TIMES THE ROKG HAS TOLERATED ACTIVITIES AND EXPRESSION OF OPINION THAT PROBABLY WOULD HAVE OCCASIONED PROSECUTION IN EARLIER YEARS.

27. BY MID-YEAR, THE RULING AND OPPOSITION PARTIES IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY PASSED A UNANIMOUS RECOMMENDATION TO THE ADMINISTRATION CALLING FOR GENEROUS TREATMENT OF VIOLATORS OF THE EMERGENCY MEASURES "SO THAT THEY MAY BE ABLE TO TAKE PART IN THE CAUSE OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT." ON JULY 17, THE ADMINISTRATION RELEASED FOURTEEN PRISONERS WHO HAD BEEN CONVICTED OF VIOLATING THE EMERGENCY MEASURES, INCLUDING TWO OF THOSE INVOLVED IN THE MARCH 1 INCIDENT.

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PAGE 04 SEOUL 06708 06 OF 07 110430Z

GOVERNMENT SPOKESMEN INDICATED THAT OTHERS MIGHT ALSO BE RELEASED.

28. AS INDICATED ABOVE, APPROVAL OF THE PROPOSED US

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PAGE 01 SEOUL 06708 07 OF 07 110458Z
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 EA-07 ISO-00 ACDA-07 MCE-00 OMB-01 TRSE-00
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R 110326Z AUG 77
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5660
INFO SECDEF
CINCPAC

S E C R E T SECTION 7 OF 7 SEOUL 6708

SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR KOREA IS DESIGNED TO FOSTER DEVELOPMENT OF A SITUATION IN WHICH THE ROK HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES COULD IMPROVE, BEARING PARTICULARLY IN MIND THAT THE PRINCIPAL JUSTIFICATION FOR THE CURRENT RESTRICTIONS ON THE PART OF THE ROKG IS THE COUNTRY'S DELICATE SECURITY SITUATION. GRADUAL DEVELOPMENT OF A MORE SECURE AND STABLE SOCIETY SHOULD THEREFORE PERMIT SOME STEPS IN THE DIRECTION WE FAVOR. CONVERSELY, REFUSAL OF THE US TO PROVIDE NECESSARY MILITARY EQUIPMENT MIGHT LEAD TO APPLICATION OF STILL MORE STRINGENT POLICIES, PARTICULARLY IF CUTS WERE OF A MAGNITUDE THAT INDICATED WITHDRAWAL OF US SUPPORT, WHICH IN TURN COULD THREATEN THE GOVERNMENT'S STABILITY. THESE POLICIES WOULD BE JUSTIFIED, IN PART, BY THE NEED FOR A HIGHER LEVEL OF MILITARY DISCIPLINE AND FOR A DRASTIC CURTAILMENT OF DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION TO PROVIDE THE WHEREWITHAL FOR INCREASED MILITARY PURCHASES; ANOTHER FACTOR WOULD BE THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF A PERCEIVED REJECTION BY THE UNITED STATES AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF A RECIPROCAL KOREAN TENDENCY TO SEEK OTHER SOCIO-POLITICAL MODELS.

ARMS TRANSFER ISSUES (PARA 4J)

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PAGE 02 SEOUL 06708 07 OF 07 110458Z

29. AS LONG AS THE ROK ARMED FORCES ARE LARGELY DEPENDENT ON THE US FOR MILITARY SUPPORT AND ARMS PURCHASES, THE US ABILITY TO RESTRAIN THE ROK FROM ARMS EXPORTS SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE SUBSTANTIAL. IT WILL HOWEVER NOT BE COMPLETE. MOST KOREAN ARMS PRODUCTION IS US LICENSED, ESPECIALLY IN ADVANCED WEAPONS, BUT THERE ARE SOME PRODUCTS (SUCH AS MORTAR AMMUNITION) OVER WHICH THE US HAS NO LEGAL CONTROLS. IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO LIMIT ROK EXPORTS OF SUCH ITEMS.

THIS DIFFICULTY IS LIKELY TO INCREASE AS THE ROK DEVELOPS A WEAPONS INDUSTRY BASED ON TECHNOLOGY IMPORTED FROM COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THE US OR DEVELOPED BY THE KOREANS THEMSELVES, AND AS DOMESTIC NEEDS ARE MET, LEAVING SURPLUS MANUFACTURING CAPACITY. THE ROKG MAY ALSO COME TO VIEW ARMS AS A USEFUL MEANS OF INCREASING POLITICAL LEVERAGE OVERSEAS AND FOR OBTAINING FOREIGN EXCHANGE. NONETHELESS, CONTINUED KOREAN DEPENDENCE ON US SECURITY GUARANTEES AND DESIRE FOR CLOSE TIES WITH THE US SHOULD PROVIDE CONSIDERABLE LEVERAGE IN AREAS OF MAJOR CONCERN TO THE US.

TRAINING (PARA 4K)

30. THE IMET PROGRAM SHOULD CONTINUE TO EMPHASIZE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT TRAINING, AT SCHOOLS SUCH AS THE DEFENSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT EDUCATION CENTER AND THE ARMY LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT CENTER, IN THE DISCIPLINES OF LOGISTICS, AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING SYSTEMS, PLANNING, PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING, AND OTHER MANAGEMENT RELATED TRAINING WHICH ARE ESSENTIAL TO THE CONTINUED EVOLUTION OF THE ROK MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. PROFESSIONAL MILITARY AND CAREER TRAINING SUCH AS PRESENTED AT THE ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF

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PAGE 03 SEOUL 06708 07 OF 07 110458Z

SCHOOL, THE AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COURSE AND THE NAVAL COMMAND COLLEGE OF THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE WILL CONTINUE IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE GROWTH OF ROK COMMAND CAPABILITY. TRAINING OF ROK PERSONNEL IN INSTRUCTIONAL SKILLS FOR THE INSTITUTION, IMPROVEMENT AND EXPANSION OF IN-COUNTRY TECHNICAL SCHOOLS MUST ALSO RECEIVE HIGH PRIORITY. THESE TYPES OF TRAINING WILL ASSIST THE ROK FORCES IN ACQUIRING THE MANAGERIAL EXPERTISE NEEDED FOR LARGER AND MORE COMPLEX INVENTORIES OF EQUIPMENT AND WILL FACILITATE THE INTERCHANGE OF MILITARY DOCTRINE. EXPANDED TRAINING COULD WELL BE REQUIRED AS THE ROK EXPANDS ITS ROLE IN OVERALL COMMAND AND CONTROL OF ITS FORCES. ALL THESE TRAINING ACTIVITIES, MOREOVER, HELP TO PROMOTE PERSONAL AND CULTURAL TIES BETWEEN KOREA AND THE US AND FOSTER DEVELOPMENT OF MORE OUTWARD LOOKING ATTITUDES AMONG PEOPLE WHO TEND TO BE SOMEWHAT INSULAR-MINDED.

31. AT PRESENT NEARLY ALL TRAINING THAT THE ROK ACQUIRES IN CONNECTION WITH FMS PURCHASED EQUIPMENT IS ALSO PURCHASED ON AN FMS BASIS. THIS PRACTICE WILL CONTINUE, ALTHOUGH THE NEED FOR SUCH TRAINING WILL DECREASE AS IN-COUNTRY TRAINING SKILLS DEVELOP.

32. THE ROK CURRENTLY FUNDS TRAVEL AND LIVING EXPENSES
FOR ITS IMET TRAINEES AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO FOR
THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. HOWEVER, THE ROK WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY
REQUEST ADDITIONAL TRAINING OVER THAT PRESENTLY UTILIZED
IF LIVING EXPENSES COULD BE CHARGED TO IMET PROGRAMS.
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Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
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